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Abstract.  This paper explores the effect of the information economy on industrial relations 
through the lens of the restructuring of German automotive sector.  Historically, this sector 
has generated important insights about national “models” and the political economy of work.  
I argue that vertical disintegration has created new market-mediated boundaries that have 
undermined existing patterns of organized industrial relations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Increasingly, policymakers want to turn their countries into “information societies” or 
“knowledge economies.”   Under the assumption that the world has, in some sense, become 
“boundaryless,” identities shifted, and place engulfed by a nebulous “space of flows” of 
finance, telecommunications, migration, and tourism, it has become questionable whether 
idiosyncratic, place-based social arrangements can survive.  Can these trends co-exist with 
nationally particular and politically desirable levels of equality and social security (as Castells 
and Himanen, 2002 argue), or are they linked to global trends of welfare state retrenchment, 
union decline, and work intensification?   
This paper explores part of this question through the lens of the restructuring of the 
German automotive sector.  There are many reasons to expect that the changes associated 
with the information society would be mediated by tradition and institutions, and that old 
practices coexist with new ones as institutional “hybrids.”  Large German export-oriented 
firms such as the automakers play a central role in domestic industrial relations.  As one 
observer put it, “[n]owhere else has the German industrial relations system performed better 
than in the automobile industry, and no industry has in the past contributed more to the 
evolution of the system” (Streeck, 1992).  The automakers still have the largest concentrations 
of union members and historically were important sites of post-Taylorist work reorganization 
projects and strikes for higher pay and shorter working time.  Because of sectoral bargaining, 
workers’ participation rights, and unions’ willingness to back up partnership with contention, 
union power was “projected” from well-organized workplaces into the rest of the German 
economy (Thelen, 1991).  This mattered for public policy: in the face of globalization, it 
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seemed that governments could promote equity and efficiency, and high wages and worker 
participation could enhance the performance of firms and nations (Streeck 1992).   
Few, if any, observers of German industrial relations hold these views today.  Since 
the early 1990s, German industry has seen a major rollback of old trade union gains.  
Autonomous subsidiaries, joint ventures, spinoffs, outsourcing, and temporary agencies have 
all created precarious, low-paid work in Germany that would have been impossible in-house 
(Hendrix et al, 2004; Doellgast and Greer, 2007).  Workers at the firms that assemble cars 
have, in turn, faced neo-taylorite production standardization and corporate whipsawing 
practices, allowing the firms to lower the overall cost of producing a car (Springer, 1999), 
creating new dilemmas and problems for worker representatives (Doerre, 2002).  The auto 
industry has not been an exception to the overall trend toward concession bargaining; in fact, 
concessionary agreements at the large automakers have been highly visible examples of this 
rollback.  Surprisingly, these challenges to the German model have come not during a slump, 
but during a period of unprecedented productivity and employment in the auto industry. 
Consensus exists that the German model is no longer what it once was, but the 
processes and causes of change remain subject to debate.  Most writers view this change as a 
matter of decentralization, agreed to, and steered by, the state, unions and employers 
associations.  Despite high labor costs, elites maintain this system, either due to the economic 
self interest of employers exploiting a “comparative institutional advantage” and pushing the 
growth of “complementary” institutions (Soskice and Hall 2001) or due to the tendency of 
society to take countermeasures against potentially harmful market forces, or “re-embed,” 
economic activity (Streeck and Thelen 2005).  Other writers, following Lash & Urry (1987), 
view change as disorganized, basically outside the control of the industrial relations system 
and its actors, with a tendency to introduce market regulation, and weaken the authority of 
industrial relations norms, in more and more areas (Doellgast & Greer 2006).  
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Complementarities, re-embedding and disorganization are the three basic interpretations that 
will be operationalized and assessed below using the case of the German automobile industry. 
This paper will focus on the interaction between the trends toward vertical 
disintegration of corporate structures and the erosion of German industrial relations 
institutions. Vertical disintegration usually means the creation of new intermediate markets 
within a production process that was previously carried out within a single organization (see 
Jacobides 2005: 465).  In the auto industry, this includes the establishment of new subsidiaries 
and joint ventures, the outsourcing of production and support services to third parties, and the 
outsourcing of staffing to temporary agencies.  These firms collaborate not only in 
manufacturing, but also in design and other production-related services, which usually 
requires extensive syncronization between the assembler (the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer, or OEM) and contractor (Jürgens 2003).  Vertical disintegration is intimately 
bound up with the compression of state and time: new information technology systems 
accelerate information flows across firm boundaries, and just-in-time logistics techniques do 
the same for parts.  In Germany, it is debatable how this blurring of firm boundaries affects 
the institutions of industrial relations.  Institutional theory tends to emphasize stability; I will 
argue below that vertical disintegration has had deeply disruptive effects. 
This paper begins with an overview of the German industrial relations system and the 
theories that it inspired.  Then it describes vertical disintegration and the disorganization of 
industrial relations in the automotive sector, focusing on three companies and some of their 
contractors.1  It concludes with a critical assessment of institutional theories of in the light of 
the empirical material. 
  
                                                 
1
 These case studies are based on 79 interviews with 63 interviewees from late 2003 through early 2007, as well as documents, mainly 
collective agreements, newspaper articles and consultants’ reports gathered in the course of field research.  In each of the three cases, I spoke 
to OEM works councillors, supplier works councillors, local IG Metall full-time officials, and managers.  Where possible I also spoke to 
outside experts, union dissidents, union full-time officials representing workers in support services, staff of local Gesamtmetall affiliates, and 
managers at suppliers.  Most of these interviews took place in the Cologne and Stuttgart areas and in South-Eastern Saxony.   
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2. Coordination and disorganization 
In an era of globalization, why do industrial relations scholars believe in national 
models?  Why not accept that within-country diversity is at least as great as between-country 
variation, and that national policies are as likely to work in tension with one another as they 
are to work as an integrated whole?  Research on Germany from the 1980s played an 
important part in cementing the nation-state as a unit of analysis, for some good reasons. 
Scholars have long described the German pattern of industrial relations as a “dual 
system.”  Unions and employers bargained sector-level framework agreements stipulating 
guidelines for wage minima, hours and other conditions of work.  The automotive assemblers 
and most of their suppliers were covered by the metal and electrical industry agreement, 
which also covered aerospace, shipbuilding and various other manufacturing industries.  The 
union Industriegewerkschaft Metall represented workers at this level; its counterpart was the 
employers association Gesamtmetall.  These national social partners worked with local- and 
state-level affiliates to bargain a national framework of bargaining for the metal and 
electronics industries, which included OEMs, most large auto parts makers, and a wide range 
of other manufacturing industries.  Within the firms, works councilors bargained specific 
regulations, for example over pay scales or working-time arrangements, to implement the 
sectoral agreement.  Firms that belonged to the employers association were required by law to 
abide by the agreement as a minimum; according to a statutory “Günstigkeitsprinzip,” 
however, management and works councilors would negotiate improvements, such as shorter 
hours or higher pay.  The agreement would cover everyone in a firm to which it applied, 
including service occupations, such as cleaners, cooks, and drivers.  Works councilors abided 
by the agreement not only for legal reasons, but also because they identified with the union 
and used training and other support services provided by the union.  Employers abided by the 
agreement, because they feared industrial conflict, they wanted to attract and retain a 
Page 5 of 30 
committed and qualified workforce, and they relied on the support services of the employer 
association.  As firms became more productive, workers and managers – especially in the 
OEMs – negotiated wage increases above the sectoral agreement, known as übertarifliche 
Leistungen, or over-tariff payments.  The German auto industry of the 1980s thus saw mutual 
gains on a massive scale and attracted much attention from the U.S. and U.K., especially 
among academics seeking ways to improve national competitiveness. 
Over the past 20 years, however, the model has changed.  For example, an increasing 
range of topics have to be negotiated at the firm or workplace level.  Already in the wake of 
the 1984 strike, a national agreement to reduce the work week to 35 hours led to thousands of 
agreements for more flexible working-time arrangements.  Gesamtmetall and IG Metall 
likewise introduced “opening clauses” in the 1990s to give works councilors and mangers the 
ability to negotiate cost savings without leaving employers’ associations.  These agreements 
required the approval of the union and employers association, as well as evidence of 
economic difficulty at the firm.  Most works councilors remained affiliated with unions and 
large companies remained affiliated with employers associations; decentralization was 
therefore not seen as a serious threat to the logic of the system.  Scholars called this kind of 
centralized control over change “coordinated decentralization” (Traxler, 1995).   
It is these mechanisms of coordination that have begun to break down.  Although 
union membership among works councilors remains high, union density in the workplace as a 
whole has declined dramatically, from above one third in the 1980s to less than one-fifth 
today.  This loss of membership has made it increasingly difficult for unions to strike and 
bargain for improvements and set the stage for IG Metall’s bruising defeat in East Germany in 
summer 2003.  Employers associations have established subsidiaries that offer services 
without the requirement that they pay according to the agreement.  In regions with tight labor 
markets and strong unions (like the Stuttgart area), employers remain bound by the agreement 
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in order to attract employees with high wages and to avoid industrial conflict.  Elsewhere (like 
East Germany), as one secretary at a local employers’ association office told me, those that 
remain bound to sectoral agreements do so merely out of tradition.  The labor market 
justification has become irrelevant due to high unemployment, the labor peace argument has 
been undermined by a decline in union membership, and the issue of tradition has grown less 
important with the proliferation of new firms.  The vertical disintegration of the German 
corporation has made it possible for managers to redefine parts of the work process, to shift 
work into cheaper agreements in other sectors, with weaker unions and lower pay (Doellgast 
and Greer 2007).  
One sophisticated variant of this line of reasoning is the thesis of disorganization 
formulated by Lash and Urry (1987).  While institutionalists have argued that the overall trend 
in capitalist organization differed between Germany and the English-speaking world, Lash 
and Urry argued that encompassing institutional structures and national coordination of 
industrial development and wages were collapsing throughout the capitalist world.  Although 
it had happened first in the UK and US, they also described disorganization tendencies in 
Germany and Sweden.  It was just a matter of time, they argued, as globalization, the rise of 
finance capital, the decline of class-based politics and the growth of white collar and service-
sector work proceeded.  The prediction was that some of the changes ascribed a decade later 
to the information society would be part of a broader trend toward institutional 
disorganization that affected industrial relations. 
The answer of institutionalists to this challenge was to acknowledge change, stress its 
incremental character and assert that the industrial relations system was flexible enough to 
remain relevant.  There is not enough space here to cover the vast amount of work on this 
subject, but two arguments stand out as theories of institutional resilience: complementarity 
and re-embedding.  The complementarity thesis is the basic causal argument in the “varieties 
Page 7 of 30 
of capitalism” framework.  It posits that it is not in employers’ interests to abandon national 
institutions in Germany, partly because it would antagonize organized labor, but more 
importantly, because it would undermine their ‘comparative institutional advantage’, such as 
vocational training and corporate governance (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  In German industrial 
relations, the central bit of evidence for this is the competitiveness of export-oriented 
industries such as auto and machine tool manufacturing, despite adhering to the high wage 
levels written into metal-industry collective bargaining.  Whatever the social relations or 
political pressures, the product strategies of German automakers should, according to this 
theory, prevent them from undermining sector-level collective bargaining.   
The re-embedding thesis is an attempt to overcome the functionalism and implied 
conservatism of “varieties” and deal with observed change.  It suggests that liberalization is 
happening, even in Germany, but it is “re-embedded,” as society places limits on market 
relations.  The claim is not just that market rules differ across countries, because they are 
embedded in other social relations, but, following Polanyi, that a dynamic process is 
underway whereby society seeks to re-regulate.  “Liberalization always comes with, and is 
enveloped by, all sorts of countermeasures taken by society – or respective societies in line 
with their respective traditions – against the destructive effects of ‘free’ self-regulated 
markets” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 4).  Regulation here comes from outside the economic 
system, from unions, parliaments or regulators, and can violate the logic of intensified 
competition or of employer strategies.  In German industrial relations, the most important 
piece of evidence for this mechanism is the difficulty employers had during the 1990s in 
rolling back the past gains of the labor movement.  The main reason they were unable to make 
major gains was that managers of large, capital intensive firms feared industrial conflict.  This 
paralysis on the employers’ side served to keep the basic German model intact (Thelen and 
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Kume, 1999); later, the model remained intact within the large firms, “underwritten” by the 
“breaking off of more peripheral sectors and firms” (Thelen and Kume 2006).   
Change in German industrial relations has thus led to revisions in, and challenges to, 
institutional theory.  Whether the independent variable is business strategy or societal effects, 
the dependent variable has become institutional development itself; in theory, institutions 
remain the mediating variable between actor strategies and the economic environment, on the 
one hand, and workplace change, on the other.  The term “institution” has a wide range of 
meanings, but generally means the “rules of the game.”  Under Streeck and Thelen’s 
definition, rules are only institutionalized when they are enforced by third parties under the 
threat of sanctions.  For example, “in a country with an institutionalized right to collective 
bargaining, an employer who turns his shop into a union-free environment will be reproached 
not only by the unions he has locked out, but also by the courts. . .” (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005: 10).  Partly because of the gap between the “ideal pattern of a rule” and the “real pattern 
of life,” they argue, institutions have a way of changing, apparently without losing their 
obligatory character.   
 
3. The German auto industry: good performance and institutional change 
What has changed in German auto plants?  One important development has been the 
rise of in-firm pacts.  It has become standard practice for automakers to demand, and win, 
concessions in collective agreements in exchange for investment (for overviews of evidence 
on German firm-level pacts, see Rehder, 2002; Massa-Wirth and Seifert, 2004).  These 
concessions need not violate sectoral agreements, and at automakers they tend not to.  
Considerable leeway for this exists at automakers because of a long history of upward wage-
drift, and eliminating above-tariff payments has yielded considerable savings for employers.  
These agreements can also regulate the use of agency temps and the outsourcing of services, 
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either allowing outside firms to bring in lower paid groups of workers or reducing the pay of 
support staff below the level allowed by the metal and electronics agreement.  Outsourcing 
arrangements do not necessarily entail the derecognition of the union as a bargaining agent, 
because the work can be redefined as in a different industry, where a different agreement 
applies.  Working hours are another source of savings.  Firms win agreements to extend 
working hours or eliminate holidays in order to ramp up production without having to pay 
overtime or hire new workers.  The use of teams in assembly work and continuous 
improvement (Kaizen or waste elimination) elsewhere is spreading and are often standardized 
through a “production system” like the Mercedes Production System.  These enable 
systematic comparisons of processes and performance and facilitate the extension of market 
logic into new areas of corporate management (Brinkmann and Doerre 2006).   
This rollback has not come during a crisis, but rather in a boom period.  Unlike the 
British and Italian auto industries, which have lost considerable market share during the 
1990s, the German industry recovered from the crisis of the mid-1990s quite well.  German 
market share in the European market has not gone below 39% (calculated as a percentage of 
registrations in the EU) since the late 1980s.  This has meant an expansion, not only in the 
number of cars produced, but also in employment, a remarkable achievement given the 
pervasive “waste elimination” practices.  While overall manufacturing employment has 
dropped by 10.2% since 1995, automakers have added jobs, mainly white-collar jobs in 
design and administration.  While auto industry employment is roughly the same as at the last 
boom (1988-1991), productivity improvements have increased the number of cars assembled 
to unprecedented levels (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). 
The industry is thriving and most of the large firms are profitable.  Why, then, have the 
trade unionists who lead the works councils accommodated management’s demands for 
concessions?  The country’s high level of unemployment – in September 2006, 10.1% 
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nationwide, 8.5% in the west and 16.4% in the east (Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit 2006) – has 
been one reason.  Success in manufacturing has not translated into overall economic well-
being, and local IG Metall offices have been reluctant to discourage concession bargaining in 
cases where union members’ jobs are at stake.  In multinational firms, a further problem is the 
growth in capacity without the expected development in demand; this has hit Opel and VW 
especially hard, since they embarked on ambitious expansion programs beginning in the early 
1990s.  These companies have more manufacturing space than they can use, and therefore can 
negotiate concessions either through explicit threats (as at Opel) or through detailed 
consultations backed up by implicit threats (as at VW).  The growing importance of price-
based competition has also not helped; in a world where luxury cars are made in Hungary, the 
notion of production niches made possible by high wage and skill levels seems obsolete.  The 
threat of disinvestment has become more plausible, even as automotive employment in 
Germany has increased.  Lastly, competition between the domestic OEMs has intensified, 
even in the luxury car market.  BMW, Porsche, Audi and DaimlerChrysler have all embarked 
on expansion programs, leading to growing production capacities, explicit comparisons and 
coordinated demands from employers (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008).   
Vertical disintegration has exacerbated all of these problems, because it has created a 
wedge between groups of workers in different firms, mainly in order to reduce costs: 
The reassignment of work to an establishment with a different collective 
agreement (or no agreement) contributed to an increasingly complex mix of 
firm, sectoral and occupational bargaining structures in each industry. This 
made it more difficult for worker representatives to co-ordinate across 
locations and easier for employers to introduce variation in pay and working 
conditions for different groups of workers. All of the companies we examined 
successfully cut costs across their production chain through outsourcing work, 
spinning off subsidiaries, or contracting with temporary agencies (Doellgast 
and Greer 2007: 70). 
  
This is not to say that firms break up their structures with the intention of weakening 
unions.  The top reasons manufacturing firms give for outsourcing is cost reduction, enhanced 
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flexibility, coping with over- and under-capacities and acquiring new technology (Kinkel and 
Lay 2003).  Nevertheless, contractors are less likely to be covered by a collective agreement 
or works council than the firms that put work out to bid (Hendrix et al, 2004).   
 
Table 1.  Changes in production depth (value added as a share of production 
value) 
Company VW   
(K)                      
AUDI 
(K)                      
DAIMLER 
(K)                   
OPEL 
(U)                       
FORD 
(U)              
PORSCHE 
(U)             
BMW 
(K)                        
Total 
1989 42.6 a  50.9 39.3 33.2 39.3 42.6 41.3 
1990 40.5  A 49.7 38.7 33 39.2 43 40.7 
1991 38.4  A 49.8 35.9 31.3 43.1 43 40.2 
1992 35.8  A 51.3 34.2 33.3 48.4 43.2 41 
1993 37.9  A 48.2 33.3 34.5 43 43.9 40.1 
1994 39.7 35.2 45.9 33.6 34 42.9 42.9 39.2 
1995 40.8 34.1 40.5 31.3 32.2 46.2 42.1 38.2 
1996 38.5 33.8 42.3 30.7 28.4 48.2 41.4 37.6 
1997 39.8 33.9 B  29.6 25.5 47.5 40.8 36.2 
1998 37.2 31.2 B 29.3 26.7 49.7 b  34.8 
Source: IG Metall -  Balance-sheet data bank, K = group (Konzern), U = company 
(Unternehmen) , compiled in EIRO 2000.  (a) included in figures of Volkswagen; (b) 
turnover costs not available 
 
OEMs in the auto industry have several ways that they vertically disintegrate: they 
outsource production and design of components to contractors; employ firms to carry out 
support services inside the plant; use temporary agencies to recruit and employ workers in 
core manufacturing processes; create autonomous organizations, like subsidiaries or joint 
ventures, in new business areas; and turn existing components plants into independent spinoff 
firms or joint ventures.  It is not that big companies are being broken up into small companies; 
instead, multinationals are emerging to partner with the OEMs Europe or worldwide.  The 
new firms are not just manufacturing simple parts; some are large firms delivering 
sophisticated subassemblies (or “modules”) and taking on complex service functions like 
design (Jürgens 2004).  Over the 1990s, there was a nearly universal trend toward vertical 
disintegration among the OEMs, with average production depth declining from 41.3% to 
34.8% (see table 1).  Since then, as we will see in the cases below, this trend has continued. 
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3.1 VW Sachsen: a turbulent East German “domestic transplant.”   
 
VW Sachsen is the East German subsidiary of VW, established in the industrial 
valleys of Southwestern Saxony shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall.  Ulrich Jürgens 
(1998) calls it a “domestic transplant,” because VW used it as a pilot plant to try out new 
techniques of supply-chain management and team organization, in hopes of achieving greater 
productivity than in the west.  VW Sachsen was established as East German industry on the 
sites of a vertically integrated, monopolistic “combine” established by the German 
Democratic Republic to manufacture cars.  VW located its production on two sites where the 
old Trabant was made (an assembly plant and an engine plant), and sought an unprecedented 
degree of flexibility by outsourcing services and production and using agency temps.  The 
firm’s policy was to demand that suppliers locate within 12 kilometers of the assembly plant 
in Zwickau.  As a result, this town of around 100,000 residents became one of the few places 
in the east to actually see an expansion of manufacturing employment after the mid-1990s.  
As the company ramped up production, employment at the subsidiary slowly increased to 
above 7,000 employees.  As VW Sachsen developed, however, a series of problems emerged. 
VW’s sourcing practices in Zwickau created a major insider-outsider problem between 
union members in the well-organized OEM (where union density is between 60% and 70%) 
and the poorly organized suppliers.  Rather than abiding by the wages in the west, which were 
high by West German standards, VW Sachsen abided by the local sectoral agreement, with its 
lower pay and longer working times than the core workforce in Wolfsburg.  Furthermore, 
workers at in-plant contractors were no longer paid according to metal industry wages, but 
rather according to a patchwork of sectoral and in-plant norms.  The OEM complicated things 
further after 2000 by establishing Autovision, a temporary agency touted in the west as a way 
to find opportunities for the unemployed.  In Saxony, Autovision has two segments: one that 
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supplies workers to its own plants at the same wages as VW workers and another that supplies 
workers at lower wages to other firms, often in VW’s supply chain. 
In the late 1990s, VW changed its policy of demanding that suppliers produce in the 
region.  In order to reduce costs, the company asked suppliers to move considerable amounts 
of work to lower-cost countries, such as the nearby Czech Republic.  VW further strengthened 
its business case for outsourcing and switching suppliers by creating its own supplier 
subsidiaries, such as VW Borgnitzer, that competed with outside suppliers based on lower 
Central and Eastern European labor costs.  Although the OEM still demanded some local 
production capacity, some suppliers began maintaining little more than a warehouse in the 
region, to receive deliveries from Poland, the Czech Republic or Romania and send them on 
to the customer.  For IG Metall members at local auto suppliers, this created a serious job 
security problem.   
VW management argued that it needed the cost reductions to maintain local 
employment, and the OEM’s works council had little incentive to assist their colleagues 
fighting layoffs.  Indeed, worker representatives had no alternative plan for VW Sachsen.  
Works councilors at the contractors, feeling this squeeze, noted in interviews that they 
understood the behavior of the works council at the OEM, since the jobs at VW depended on 
low costs.  With problems aplenty in the core, it was hard even for the affected workers to 
imagine how VW’s works council could provide meaningful support. 
The core-periphery tension became painfully clear in the case of a German firm, 
Dräxlmeier, which supplied wire harness subassemblies for the Passat.  With the model 
changeover in 2003, VW put the work out to bid, meaning that the jobs of workers at the 
incumbent companies depended on their employers’ ability to provide the lowest bid.  
Dräxlmeier lost the bid to VW Borgnitzer, then a fully-owned subsidiary of VW with 
production in Germany, Poland and Romania.  The mostly female Dräxlmeier workforce 
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mounted a public campaign to keep their jobs.  Although they won some support from the 
local IG Metall and local politicians and boosted IG Metall membership in the workplace, 
VW stood by its decision, and the plant closed.  According to works councilors two years 
after the closure, some of Dräxlmeier workers had been shifted into Autovision, others 
remained unemployed, and some found work directly employed in other factories, mostly at 
lower wages. 
The outsourcing of services has created similar difficulties for the union and works 
council.  Not only can the OEM switch contractors, but vertical disintegration blurs the 
jurisdiction of unions and creates multiple works councils in the production process.  
Problems emerged in the Chemnitz engine plant in early 2005, when VW switched logistics 
providers, from the Dutch firm TNT to the Wolfsburg-based Schnellecke Group.  The new 
employer attempted to lay off the incumbent workforce and replace it with agency temps from 
Autovision.  With legal support from the local DGB and the services union ver.di and moral 
support from VW works councilors, the workers sued the new employer, charging violations 
of federal transfer of undertakings rules.  In the settlement that followed, Schnellecke paid 
each worker €4200 back wages and rehired 120 out of 142 core TNT workers, albeit with 
reductions in the base wage from seven to six euros an hour. 
The use of temporary agencies has also created problems for worker representatives, 
even though they are paid the same as core workers (though only if they are doing the same 
work as VW Sachsen employees).  Management has wanted a numerically flexible workforce 
in order to respond to rapid swings in demand.  This has been especially important at the 
engine plant, which has to respond to the demand for vehicles at various assembly plants.  
Agency temps, in principle, enabled management to do this, since they were easier to lay off 
than core workers; the problem for the works council was that the precariousness of their 
position made them more difficult to represent.  Second, because of high unemployment and 
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the prospects for being taken onto the “core team,” [Kernmannschaft] their incentives to work 
harder are much greater than those of core employees.  This allows managers to use the 
discretionary effort of temporary employees as a justification for work intensification.  It was 
not until 2003 and a change in the works council leadership, that the company actually agreed 
to limit the number of agency temps to 140 in the engine plant.  Although the limit was 
reached over the objections of local management, a 2005 works agreement increased it by 50. 
Despite strong union organization, the VW Sachsen works council has also been 
unable to fend off concessions in the core.  Since 2003, unionists have faced a series of 
setbacks, which have shaped bargaining policy.  The summer 2003 metal industry strike was 
especially difficult for trade unionists, since it was widely opposed by the local media and 
political establishment and publicly criticized by IG Metall works councilors in the west, who 
faced production stoppages in their own plants due to shortages of parts from Eastern 
suppliers.  The 2004 concessions at VW in West Germany and the Dresden plant (which was 
established later and is not part of the subsidiary) put further pressure on local works 
councilors, who had previously enjoyed cost and flexibility advantages over the West.  In 
2005, the works council agreed to €50m in concessions, including the elimination of several 
days off and delays in the implementation of a new sectoral agreement. 
In German industrial relations, the development of the east has been a major source of 
uncertainty and a major object of study.  A central part of VW’s strategy has been to increase 
the degree of outsourcing and use of agency temps.  These workers are paid according to a 
wide range of different agreements, including standards mirroring the core workforce (at 
Autovision Produktion), cheaper sectoral agreements (at Schnellecke and most of the other 
service providers, as well as their temporary agencies), house agreements and no agreement at 
all (as at the service providers at the Dresden plant, which also lack works councils).  
Weakened by a lost strike, concessions to the west, opportunities to shift work east, and the 
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uncertainty of their employers’ relationship with the OEM, workers at VW Sachsen and its 
supply chain are further than ever from establishing classic German labor-management 
relations in their firms.   
 
3.2. Ford/Visteon: patchwork regulation in the West.   
In the 1990s, Ford was the least vertically integrated of the OEMs.  In 1998 it made its 
structure even leaner by spinning parts plants (including three in Germany) off into a new 
company, Visteon, and spinning three transmission plants off, including one in Cologne, into 
a joint venture called Getrag Ford Transmissions (GFT).  Furthermore, in the 2001 remodel of 
the Cologne plant, the company created an “industry park” for suppliers to deliver and pre-
assemble modules.  Visteon was the most problematic of these projects, since it lacked a 
coherent business plan.  The result was a set of deep concessions negotiated in 2003 to reduce 
costs throughout the system, including the massive use of outsourcing in service areas and the 
use of temporary agencies, and further concessions in 2005 under the threat of bankruptcy.  
GFT went more smoothly for workers, since it was focused on a single product and involved a 
viable plan to combine the mass-production manufacturing capacity of Ford with new 
technology supplied by Getrag.  The industry park is somewhere in between.  Although 
unions are well organized there, there is a persistent tension between the OEM’s works 
council, who would like to have the work brought back in-house to employ core workers, and 
the works councilors in the supplier park, whose constituents are threatened by this. 
In early 2000 the works council negotiated a deal to shield Visteon workers from 
possible layoffs.  At the time, Ford was restructuring its European operations by closing, 
outsourcing and spinning off operations, while increasing the number of models.  Worker 
representatives, led by Wilfried Kuckelkorn, the chair of both the central (German) works 
council and the European works council, accepted restructuring on the condition that they 
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could bargain over its effects at the transnational level.  Visteon was the first test case of this 
strategy; in the following years, international agreements covered spun off transmission plants 
in the three countries and a further restructuring at Visteon known as the “Plan for Growth.” 
The European spinoff agreement established a framework for negotiations at the 
national level.  Unlike the Visteon agreement in the US, under which employees retained their 
status as Ford employees, the European agreement stipulated that workers would either 
exercise flow-back rights to Ford or become employees of the new company.  Those who 
stayed would retain the same level of wages and working conditions as those at Ford for the 
rest of their working lives.  Worker representatives also negotiated a catalog of parts that Ford 
would continue to buy in contractually stipulated volumes from Visteon until 2007.  The 
agreement covered the largest of Visteon’s 26 European plants, including three of Ford’s five 
plants in Germany (Berlin, Wülfrath and Düren), one in France (Bordeaux) and four in the 
UK (Belfast, Basildon, Enfield and Swansea). 
In Germany, the spun off plants accounted for nearly 4000 of Ford’s 34,000 workers.  
The national-level agreement allowed the company to eliminate over-tariff payments for new 
employees, who would be paid the minimum allowable by the sectoral agreement.  Like in the 
U.S., new plants were left out of the bargaining unit.  This latter point was crucial, since 
Visteon expanded more aggressively in Europe than in the U.S.  In future iterations of 
Europe-level bargaining, newly purchased plants, such as French and Italian plants purchased 
from Plastic Omnium, would remain outside the scope of European-level bargaining.  Newly 
constructed gas tank plants supplying VW in Mosel and Emden – which had very few Visteon 
employees – were entirely outside the scope of the works council’s jurisdiction, and works 
councilors only found out about them through their role on the firm’s supervisory board. 
In 2003, managers and worker representatives were disappointed with the performance 
of the company.  As works councilors nervously approached the expiration date of the parts 
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catalog, dependence on Ford was still 70% or higher at all three plants.  Without the 
improvements in business, German unionists, in cooperation with colleagues in France and 
the UK, approved a second round of restructuring, the “Plan for Growth.”  In exchange for 
investment, worker representatives accepted measures to reduce costs by €140m a year.  The 
European-level agreement stipulated the amount of savings to be had in each plant, through 
massive personnel reductions, a shift towards use of agency temps and increased outsourcing.  
This shift of work out of the company had a similar effect as the two-tier wages in the U.S., 
since the outsourced and temporary workers worked under sectoral collective agreements for 
services paying below the metal agreement.  With considerable hesitation, but little resistance, 
worker representatives supported the company in hopes that it would grow up to become a 
global player in the auto supply business.   
In Germany, labor and management hammered out plans to restructure the workplace 
at the three main factories.  The most problematic plant manufactured plastic parts, mainly 
dashboards, in Berlin.  Established in 1981 on the edge of West Berlin as a cold war 
Prestigeobjekt for global management, 99% of the plant’s work was for Ford, and the plant 
was losing €30m a year.  In order to save €25m a year, the works council agreed to downsize 
the core workforce from 630 workers to 340 at a plant that had once employed 1,300 people.  
They closed one of the paint shops, eliminated extra pay for Saturday work, implemented a 
new cellular work design (without work groups, which local management opposed), reduced 
pay for some classifications of workers, outsourced logistics work (to TNT, which lacked a 
works council locally and paid €9 an hour) and employed 150 temporary workers as a semi-
permanent cost-cutting measure.  The plant saved a further €1.3m through a new lease with 
Berlin’s government, which owns the industrial park; this agreement sent a signal to the 
region and the workforce that the location would be there on that site until 2014.  Under a 
government-funded active labor market scheme, known as a Transfergesellschaft, 60 out of 
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120 workers who sought new jobs succeeded, primarily in the local metalworking industry.  
Core workers did not go into lower paid jobs in the plant; given unemployment rates in the 
high teens, works councilors viewed a placement rate of 50%, mainly in the local 
metalworking sectors, as a success.  By 2005, the plant was breaking even.   
In 2005, however, the company brought its American restructuring strategy to Europe.  
Managers told worker representatives that the company was still not competitive enough and 
needed to make further cuts.  Global management had narrowed their idea of the firm’s core 
competencies, and the continuing inability of these plants to win business outside of Ford 
remained a major handicap, especially as the parts catalog was expiring.  They reached a new 
agreement with further personnel cuts and extending wage concessions to the core workforce, 
this time at the national level, like in the US, under the threat of bankruptcy.  In 2006, Visteon 
sold two of its main plants to the Munich-based private-equity firm Orlando.  
Not all vertical disintegration has gone badly at Ford: the 2001 spinoff of transmission 
production in Cologne into GFT went relatively smoothly.  The concessions attached to the 
investment guarantees were relatively minor, and like at Visteon there was a framework deal 
agreed to cover plants across Europe.  The main problem was variation between former Ford 
and Getrag employees and new employees; the workforce was covered by three different 
collective agreements.  However, the success of the business has taken pressure off managers 
to demand further concessions.  Unlike Visteon, the new company is focused on a single 
product market, with an infusion of new technology, and therefore lacks the uncertainty about 
“product palettes” in the plants.   
However, the case of Ford shows how disorganization was not unique to the east.  
Ford, the most vertically disintegrated German OEM in 1998, continued to spin off parts 
production, creating increased insecurity for its entirely West German workforce.  The fate of 
plants has come to depend on their ability to compete on outside markets for the parts they 
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produce, rather than a strategic role to secure supplies for the OEM.  In the unsuccessful 
spinoff, Visteon, concessions have been much deeper than Ford, including massive in-plant 
outsourcing and use of agency temps as a semi-permanent measure to reduce costs.  Some of 
the bargaining has been quite innovative, such as the EU-wide restructuring agreements, and 
it has not produced uniformly bad outcomes for workers, as the GFT story showed.  However, 
the trend toward disorganization is clear.  In Ford’s value-added chain, the bargaining scene is 
a patchwork of different firm-level and sectoral agreements (the supplier park), adherence to 
the minimums of the metalworking sectoral agreement (pre-breakup Visteon), norms that 
mirror Ford (GFT) and a patchwork of low paying sectoral agreements (the temporary 
agencies and service providers in the Visteon plants).   
 
3.3. DaimlerChrysler: concessions as the alternative.   
As table one shows, Daimler-Benz has traditionally been the most vertically integrated 
large German automaker, and it remained so after its 1998 merger with Chrysler.  Although 
the degree of outsourcing varies from plant to plant, it has major production facilities for large 
“aggregate” parts, such as transmissions and engines that other companies buy largely from 
the outside.  Works councilors do not report systematic attempts to create low-wage work in 
the supply chain, like at VW Sachsen, but examples do exist; in the three years after the 
company established an International Framework Agreement stipulating that suppliers should 
respect core labor standards, five out of the fifteen violators of union rights were workplaces 
in Germany (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008).   
Because of the high degree of vertical integration, outsourcing is a large, untapped 
source of savings for Daimler’s management.  In 2005 bargaining for a works agreement, the 
company won a projected €500 million per year savings.  The company’s strategy included 
whipsawing, threats of outsourcing and disinvestment, demands of concessions that would 
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violate the sectoral agreement, and talk of a Baden-Württemberg-specific “sickness,” in a 
region once known as the model region, the Musterländle.  A nation-wide mobilization 
ensued, with demonstrations and letters of solidarity from foreign plants.  The works council 
negotiated a complex set of concessions that reduced the amount of pay that new workers 
would receive above the sectoral agreement and made some allowances to get around the 
provisions of the agreement.  It included a series of pay concessions for new workers, 
reduction of the guidelines for annual wage increases, new wage tables equalizing pay 
between white and blue-collar workers, and greater management discretion in shifting 
workers between plants.  While the current workers would be protected from cuts, the future 
workforce would be deeply divided, and pay depended not only on the worker’s job and 
number of years of service, but the date of hire in relation to the implementation of the new 
wages and whether he or she was in a “core” job or one that was easy to outsource.  In 
exchange, the company agreed to a list of location-specific investment guarantees.  It also 
agreed to avoid any new outsourcing services until 2012 and to discuss possibilities of “in-
sourcing” using the new pay grades, oriented on the lower pay structures of the service sector. 
One of the more painful provisions of this agreement – wage concessions in support 
services – was a direct result of vertical disintegration.  Management viewed these areas as 
especially easy places to make cost savings, due to the growth of the outsourcing industry and 
piecemeal plant-by-plant experimentation.  The agreement opened the door for plant-specific 
negotiations over wage concessions to reduce the pay in indirect work areas (security, 
cafeteria, cleaning, maintenance, etc.) by 20%, i.e., below the level of the metal industry 
agreement.  The agreement also contained working time increases in these areas.   
Although managers at Daimler usually seek to keep production work in house in order 
to control quality, there are exceptions in their collaborations with other firms.  Daimler’s first 
experiment with vertically disintegrated manufacturing was in its Smart subsidiary in the late 
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1990s, an experiment in “fractal” manufacturing in Hambach, France, near the German 
border.  This was a much deeper form of outsourcing, since parts suppliers were actually 
involved in building their parts (complex subassembled “modules”) into the vehicles.  The 
firm continued the concept in a new engine plant, opened in 2004 in Koelleda, in East 
Germany.  The plant was a joint venture with Mitsubishi, which made engines for small cars 
assembled in Japan (for Mitsubishi) and the Netherlands (for smart).  The Koelleda project 
resembled the VW Chemnitz engine plant, in that much of the on-site workforce was not 
employed by the core company, the workforce was planned to be roughly the same size, and 
provisions were made to deal with fluctuations in demand (while VW-Chemnitz used agency 
temps, MDC power used working time accounts).  Nevertheless, employment gains were 
contingent on the success of a new vehicle, the four-door Smart car, which did not sell well.  
In 2005, take-home pay was reduced and work time extended in order to pay back hours into 
the working time account, and 70 out of only 270 workers were shifted to Mercedes plants in 
Kassel and Berlin as temps employed by an internal agency.  To add to these problems, only 
30% of the workforce are IG Metall members (although the core works council is completely 
unionized), and only one of the on-site service providers had a works council.  The plant’s 
future is made even less secure by competition with the engine plant in the Untertuerkheim 
complex in Stuttgart, which makes the diesel version of the same motor.  Because 
Untertuerkheim was part of the 2005 pact, it has investment guarantees lasting until 2011 that 
MDC Power lacks. 
Even at a company known for making rather than buying its parts, vertical 
disintegration has put downward pressure on wages.  In newer, smaller parts of the company, 
hived off as subsidiaries, management has experimented with vertical disintegration.  
Although outsourcing is not as deep or systematic in the older plants, the workforce in support 
services has been hit by the industry-wide trend to vertically disintegrate.  While management 
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agreed to a 7-year moratorium on new service outsourcing, it has only done so under an 
opening clause for wages and extended working times for in-house services.  Although 
DaimlerChrysler may have some similarities with “coordinated decentralization,” this has 
given the workforce few reasons for celebration.  Even at a firm where worker representatives 
have found alternatives to outsourcing, we still see examples of unregulated work (in the 
service providers in Koelleda, for example).  Despite strong union organization in the firm as 
a whole, the disorganization elsewhere has set the overall direction of change. 
 
4. The findings: disorganization and market  
Why has there been a rollback of working conditions in the auto industry taking place 
in a context of unprecedented prosperity and (numerically) strong union organization?  The 
breakup of vertically integrated production organization, enabled by the compression of time 
and space in the production process is an important part of the answer.  Practices of sectoral 
bargaining and codetermination are not designed to override these market mechanisms that 
divide the labor force. 
The effect of vertical disintegration on industrial relations is as clear in the west as it is 
in the east and matters as much at volume producers as at luxury producers.  VW Sachsen is 
an early example of a local production system set up in post-unification East Germany to be 
flexible and to rely extensively on contractors, for parts and services, inside and outside the 
plants.  Unions and works councils have not been able to defend metal-industry standards in 
these areas, partly because of VW’s increasingly cutthroat procurement policies, partly 
because much outsourced work is no longer inside IG Metall’s jurisdiction, and partly 
because VW’s works councilors (and therefore local full-time union officers) accept the need 
for keeping costs down.  In the West, Ford has in some ways gone even further, by spinning 
off existing parts plants and forcing dramatic concessions from workers in those plants that do 
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not find business at other OEMs.  Even in relatively stable parts of the supply chain, workers 
are paid according to a patchwork of firm- and industry-level agreements.  Even at Daimler, a 
luxury automaker with a high degree of vertical integration, the threat of outsourcing has led 
to worker-side concessions, to the tune of €500 million a year, and Daimler is also 
experimenting with outsourcing in newer, smaller plants.   
While change is in the air everywhere, it plays out differently in different settings.  
Two dimensions of variation in our sample help to explain varying degree of pressure on 
worker representatives: (1) the employers’ economic success (ability to win and retain enough 
business to avoid layoffs) and (2) the establishment’s location in the industry’s power 
structure (OEM vs. supplier) (Table 2).  As the market situation changes, establishments can 
move up or down; they move left to right if they are spun off or outsourced.  The OEMs have 
mostly moved from crisis to competitiveness over the past 10 years.  Variation between plants 
seems to make less of a difference in this column than change over time, because trade 
unionists have come to accept concessions even at competitive firms like DaimlerChrysler 
and VW Sachsen.  A growing percentage of the process of making a car, however, has moved 
out of the core and into the right-hand column, where jobs become contingent on the 
employer’s ability to win and keep contracts with the OEMs.  Establishments with a viable 
business plan, like GFT, manage to maintain some continuity with past practice; otherwise 
(i.e., Visteon and the suppliers of VW Sachsen), deep concessions or mass layoffs are to be 
expected. 
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Table 2: the cases compared 
  Position of establishment  
in the industry’s power structure 
   
OEM (strong) 
 
Supplier (subordinate) 
 
Competitiveness 
DaimlerChysler, VW 
Sachsen: continued 
concessions, 
reorientation of pay of 
new workers at the 
sectoral agreement 
GFT: continued application 
of sectoral bargaining, not 
much divergence from OEM 
Economic 
viability of 
establishment 
 
Crisis  
Visteon, TNT/Chemnitz and 
Draexlmeier/Zwickau: 
cutthroat, price-based 
competition; concessions 
below the sectoral 
agreement and layoffs. 
 
 
As Jürgens, Krzywdzinski, and Teipen (2006) point out, the problem in this sector is 
not the wholesale individualization of employment regulation.  The problem is that, though 
the holes in bargaining and works council coverage remain small, the coordination 
mechanisms are breaking down.  If they were functioning in the sense of the traditional dual 
system, outsourcing would have little effect on industrial relations.  Unions and employer 
associations would continue to represent workers in the new areas after they were outsourced, 
and savings in wages through vertical disintegration would not be possible; instead, savings 
might come through improved flexibility or investment.  If a plant closed, workers could 
move on, with their transferable skills and Beruf (occupational calling) to another 
establishment with similar wages and working conditions.  In reality, workers fear 
unemployment enough to make concessions, and the union is usually willing to support them.  
These fears are reinforced as their jobs become contingent on the OEM’s willingness to renew 
contracts and the success or failure of a specific vehicle.  In some of these areas, industrial 
relations practices barely satisfy Streeck and Thelen’s definition of institutionalization: in the 
domestic supply chains of all three of these companies, firms operate with no collective 
bargaining or works council, and in East Germany, some have even punished workers for 
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attempting to set up works councils without facing sanctions.  To paraphrase institutional 
theory, unions cannot always interest the courts in enforcing, and employers in enacting, the 
rules that govern labor-management relations, even in the German automotive sector. 
A wide range of literature has suggested that union power (and employer 
disorganization) makes a difference.  Using the most common measures – union membership, 
mobilization and strike proneness and bargaining coverage – the power of unions within the 
OEMs should be considerable.  This worker-side collective power was behind the successful 
mobilizations of IG Metall members during the 1990s (Turner 1998).  In more recent years, 
however, workers in some of the best organized companies, including those discussed above, 
have given up concessions.  Many works councilors view concessions as an essential 
condition for job retention, and some of works councilors view mobilizations as mere 
spectacles or rituals, but irrelevant to the main goal of job retention.  Though they view 
concessions as necessary preconditions for retaining jobs, works councilors recognize that 
they are not sufficient for protecting the workforce; other factors, like the success of the firm 
in the product market also matter.  In this context, mobilizations can take on a “ritualistic” 
character, which express labor solidarity, but do not prevent management from winning 
reduced labor costs, as in the 2004 mobilizations of DaimlerChrysler workers against 
management’s demands; elsewhere, even going through the motions of conflict-partnership 
can be impossible, as at the suppliers in the east.  Though high union membership gives IG 
Metall massive capacity for advising, this capacity has not so far extended to a systematic 
attempt to stop outsourcing or reorganize supply chains analogous, for example, to its team-
work initiatives of the 1980s (Turner 1991).  
Whatever the merits of the complementarities thesis in understanding other 
institutional systems in other national contexts, it does not help to understand change in 
industrial relations in the German auto industry.  Employers seem to be proving that it is 
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possible to produce a quality product without the whole production process being covered by 
works councils and collective agreements.  There is little reason to think otherwise: Daimler 
has little self-interest in employing highly skilled janitors, cooks and truck-drivers other than 
to avoid conflict with the works council.  In 2005 management won works council acceptance 
of lower pay grades for them, and left-wing works councilors who wanted to organize more 
resistance to concessions were expelled IG Metall.   
In more and more workplaces, the power of unions has been weakened by new market 
relations that put some workers into precarious conditions, while temporarily securing 
competitiveness and the position of workers inside the OEM.  Models do exist of coordinating 
across these boundaries.  At DaimlerChrysler, for example, an international framework 
agreement protects the basic rights of workers in the supply chain, and at a number of supplier 
parks, IG Metall offices have succeeded in bringing up standards through collective 
bargaining.  However, just-in-time inventory and logistics techniques do not strengthen the 
power of workers by making production more sensitive to sudden stoppages in the supply 
chain.  There is no analogue here, for example, to the solidarity between dockworkers and 
seafarers to regulate Flags of Convenience shipping (Lillie 2004).  To the contrary: in the 
2003 strike, held up component deliveries to assembly plants led to union disarray and defeat.   
The resulting bargaining landscape is more fragmented than in a vertically integrated 
production process, and is characterized by concession bargaining and instability.  Although 
concessions do not guarantee lifelong employment, resistance can give management a pretext 
to disinvest.  Concessions may not be sufficient to retain work, but to threatened works 
councilors they seem necessary.  Maybe this flexibility is the only way that IG Metall and 
works councilors can continue to win support and recognition from workers and elites, given 
an atmosphere of political malaise and economic stagnation.  For the rest of the world, 
however, the benefits of German social partnership are increasingly difficult to understand. 
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